Numerous studies have confirmed a statistically significant negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. This has been labeled "The Resource Curse". In this paper we try to explain why Botswana, a country heavily dependent on its diamond industry, has managed to generate sustainable growth. Economists have advanced several explanations for the negative impact of natural resources on long-term growth. This paper focuses on the following important problems: First, a boom in a natural resource can pull resources away from other sectors of the economy, thus harming their international competitiveness, a phenomenon called the Dutch disease. Second, abundance in natural resources may lead to poor institutional quality in many countries.
Introduction
Many economic studies describe Botswana as one of Africa's star performers. The former British colony achieved independence in 1966 and was at that point one of the poorest countries in the world. Because of almost total neglect from 1885 to 1966, the independent government of Botswana inherited an economy that was very underdeveloped even with African standards: Botswana had a railway through the eastern part of the country but there were almost no tarred roads, and secondary school had only graduated 100 students until 1966 (Harvey and Lewis 1990:15-23) . Being landlocked, lacking in infrastructure and lacking in skilled labour and educated people, not many things pointed to a successful economic development for the country. However, during the post-independence period Botswana has transformed into a fast growing economy.
The country has been characterized by an impressive macroeconomic performance.
During the three decades after independence, Botswana was the fastest growing economy in the world with real per capita income growth averaging 8.2 percent per annum during 1966 -96 (Hope 2002 . Over the ten-year period from 1993 to 2003 the per capita income growth was more modest, averaging approximately three percent per annum (BIDPA 2004) . Still, Botswana is today one of the few African economies to be classified as upper middle income by the United Nations and the World Bank.
Many observers have claimed that this economic development has been realised thanks to the large findings of diamond deposits in the 70's and 80's. However, considering the large bulk of economic research that has shown how often natural resources lead to poor economic stability and growth, one should rather state that Botswana achieved enviable long-term macroeconomic development despite the big growth in the diamond mining industry. The difficulty in generating sustained growth from a natural resource could be expressed in the words of former Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda, who explained his country's poor economic performance by stating that: "We are in part to blame, but this is the curse of being born with a copper spoon in our mouth" (Saleshando 2005) .
Intuitively, one would expect an abundance of natural resources to be a blessing for an economy. However, in almost all cross-country regressions, natural resources are found to have a statistically significant negative impact on a country's growth (Sachs and Warner 1995:2; Sachs and Warner 2001:828-31) . This phenomenon has been labelled the resource curse, a name implying that countries with an abundance of natural resources are cursed rather than blessed. Botswana, one of the world's biggest exporters of diamonds, provides an intriguing example in this regard since it has successfully managed to avoid the biggest difficulties in dealing with the revenues from its natural resources and obtained world record growth rates during decades after independence. While many other resource-dependent economies stagnated, Botswana's economy blossomed and seemingly managed to beat the infamous resource curse.
Economists have advanced several explanations for the negative impact of natural resources on long-term growth. This paper focuses on several important problems that have appeared in resource-abundant countries. First, a boom in a natural resource can pull resources away from other sectors of the economy, thus harming their international competitiveness, a phenomenon called the Dutch disease. Second, abundance in natural resources has lead to poor institutional quality and led to rent seeking behaviour in many countries. Also, resource-abundant countries appear to pay less attention to education, which is essential to development. These reflections lead us to the following research question: Why has Botswana not suffered from the resource curse? This paper will begin with a presentation of the resource curse theory. We will present empirical evidence that supports the existence of a curse of natural resources, and present the different explanations for the curse. In chapter 3 we discuss the impact of the diamond boom on the country's macroeconomic performance. Here we assess the question of how Botswana avoided the resource curse. In the fourth chapter we try to explain the most important factors to Botswana's good economic performance. Finally, in our final discussion, we discuss Botswana's present situation and also comment on some problems the country is facing.
The Theory of the Curse of Natural Resources
Numerous studies have confirmed a statistically significant negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth. The pioneering work on the resource curse theory was done by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner who have thoroughly analyzed, both theoretically and empirically, the effect of natural resources on economic growth. In an often cited article, Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth, they show that, controlling for initial GDP per capita level, an increase of one standard deviation in the share of primary exports is associated with a decrease of 0.93 percent in annual GDP per capita growth (Sachs and Warner 1995:8) . This intuitively surprising empirical finding is now widely accepted and has even been said to be "...one of the most robust findings in the empirical growth literature..." (Bulte et al. 2004:1) . Examples of countries seemingly cursed by their natural resources are not hard to find. In Africa, the so called "blood diamonds" are widely believed to play an important factor in explaining the civil wars, and consequently poor growth, in countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola. In Latin America, both Bolivia and Venezuela actually found themselves having lower GDP levels after their respective oil booms (Sachs and Warner 1999:51) .
Many scholars have tried to explain the existence of this resource curse. One simple explanation has been that an abundance of natural resources could lead to what a scholar has labelled "overconfidence" (Gylfason 2001:847) . The intuition behind this explanation could be formulated in the words of the French sixteenth century philosopher Jean Bodin: "Men of a fat and fertile soil, are most commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country make men temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant, and industrious" (quoted from Sachs and Warner 1995:4) . The idea is that a society with an abundance of natural resources and easily gained wealth tends to become lazy and so confident of its wealth that it does not find motivation for hard work and economic reforming -growth is simply taken for granted.
Obviously, other explanations have also been advanced to explain theoretically the empirical findings of the resource curse. In this paper, we will focus on two different channels of the resource curse. We distinguish both purely economic explanations as well as more political theories of the transmission mechanism between natural resource abundance and poor economic growth: (1) A natural resource boom can have negative macroeconomic effects on an economy, pulling resources away from other sectors of the economy, a phenomenon called the Dutch disease. (2) Abundance in natural resources has been shown to induce poor institutional quality, high corruption and lead to a neglect of education, all of which have a negative impact on growth.
The Dutch disease
The phenomenon Dutch disease has gotten its name from the effects that North Sea gas production had on the Dutch economy. Large revenues from the gas production forced the Dutch guilder to appreciate against other currencies which weakened the competitiveness of the tradables (e.g. manufacturing) sector and caused unemployment.
The traditional Dutch disease model, which is used for a medium run analysis, describes an economy with three sectors: the booming sector, the lagging sector and the nontradable sector. The booming sector could be the oil industry or any other major exporting industry. In Botswana's case the booming sector is the mining industry. The lagging sector includes other tradables in manufacturing and agriculture. The nontradable sector includes services, utilities, transportation and so forth (Roemer 1985:237) .
The booming and lagging sector face given world prices and there is only one mobile factor, labour (Norberg and Blomström 1993:163) . In the case of a boom in a natural resource, resources might be drawn from sectors that are more conductive to long-term growth to the booming sector. If so, the total effects on the economy's possibilities to grow in the long run could be negative.
. 1 . 1 T h e s y m p t o m s o f t h e D u t c h d i s e a s e
One of the assumptions of the Dutch disease model is full employment, and according to the theory the booming sector attracts labour out of the other sectors, forcing wages to increase in the whole economy. Increasing wages lead to increasing prices for domestic goods and the lagging sector experiences lower returns and output, caused by a loss of competitiveness. There are two effects in the Dutch Disease process, the resource movement effect and the spending effect. The first effect occurs as a result of increasing demand of labour in the booming sector, which draws labour from the other sectors. The spending of the extra income generated by the booming sector (possibly through government spending based on taxes levied on the booming sector) increases the demand for domestic resources. The non-tradables sector, which is not facing international competition and a given world price, will raise prices to maintain profitability. The tradables sector, however, cannot raise prices, as they are operating on international markets, and profitability declines in spite of higher factor costs, which leads to movement of resources from the tradables to the non-tradables sector. The real exchange rate appreciates, as a consequence of the increased price ratio between non-tradables and tradables. This mechanism is called the Balassa-Samuelsson effect. Therefore, the tradables sector, which becomes less competitive, contracts. This has been labeled deindustrialization in economic literature. It is important, however, to be aware that neither the resource movement effect nor the spending effect need occur if a country has extensive underemployment (Lewis Jr, 1989 Jr, :1562 .
Changing the structure of the economy, the Dutch disease itself does not per definition have adverse long-term effects on a country's possibility to grow economically, since growth in the booming sector can more than offset the stagnation in the lagging sector.
The long-term impact of a resource boom on an economy depends on the nature of the booming sector and the lagging sector (Roemer 1985:245) . The Dutch disease can be harmful to long-term growth if the lagging sector is more conductive to growth than is the booming sector. In the Dutch disease model, the lagging sector is usually the manufacturing sector, a sector generally considered to be growth-generating, with the positive externalities and increasing returns to scale associated to it and its linkages with the rest of the economy. This is why economists often refer to the manufacturing industry as the main "engine of growth" (Bulte et al. 2004:5) . Mineral industries, such as the one in Botswana, generally have weak linkages to the rest of the economy, thus limiting the spill-over effects from that sector to the rest of the economy: "Natural resource abundant economies benefit less from the technology spill-overs that are typical in manufacturing industries..." (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004:182) Even more problematic is the case where the lagging sector is the one that creates job opportunities. According to the traditional Dutch disease model, presented above, one key assumption is full employment. In that case, the more labour intensive the booming sector is, the bigger are the resource movement and spending effects, and the bigger is the threat of negative Dutch disease symptoms. However, this assumption of full employment is rarely fulfilled, especially not in developing countries, and the threat of an over-heated labour market is smaller. In the case of large unemployment, it is when the booming sector is not labour-intensive and has the above mentioned weak linkages with the rest of the economy, hence not creating employment opportunities, that the disease could be detrimental to long-term growth (Roemer 1985 :245, Bulte et al. 2004 .
. 1 . A v o i d i n g t h e D u t c h d i s e a s e
There are a number of different options to prevent symptoms of the Dutch disease to arise and to protect the lagging industry. Reducing Dutch disease effects is a question of longterm view and resisting the temptation of overspending, which has been described as "swallowing bitter medicine" (Roemer 1985) . One policy option is to protect the real exchange rate from appreciating, in order not to harm the competitiveness of exporting industries. To avoid or reduce a real appreciation is called exchange rate protection.
Central banks in natural resource booming countries therefore play an important role in carrying out monetary policies that keep the exchange rate from appreciating too much.
One instrument for exchange rate protection is to try to neutralize the large revenues from the booming sector by keeping the revenues out of the country. In other words, the government should accumulate reserves of foreign currency and prevent the reserves from becoming monetized in the domestic economy (Roemer 1985:247) . Another measure to ensure long-term macroeconomic stability is for governments dependent on resource revenues to run budget surpluses. This reduces inflationary pressures in the economy and provides a "cushion" if world market price for the natural resource would drop.
One obvious problem with revenue sterilization and conservative fiscal policies is that it can be tempting for a government to increase expenditures and win votes in elections when export revenues are practically flowing into the country, a problem known as the "time inconsistency problem". When a country, as does Botswana, has humanitarian problems like poverty, unevenly distributed incomes and high prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS it becomes even more difficult not to increase expenditures. Governments with politicians that are trying to accumulate reserves of foreign currency, instead of dealing with humanitarian problems, could also be risking their jobs and the political stability in the country (Roemer 1985:248) .
Institutional Quality, Corruption and Neglect of Education
Another transmission mechanism by which natural resources have been found to affect economic growth negatively is by inducing poor governmental policies. In cross-country studies, an abundance of natural resource is typically associated with poor institutional quality, with relatively high corruption and with poor educational performance.
Before discussing the impact of natural resources on institutional quality it is important to note that a distinction between two types of resources has emerged in recent literature on the resource curse: point resources and diffuse resources. Point resources are resources with high geographical concentration that can be protected and controlled at a relatively modest cost, for example oil fields or diamond mines. This type of resources has been found to be easily captured by elites, to lead to rent seeking and corruption and consequently to induce bad institutional quality. This is widely believed to ruin the possibilities of economic growth, since "…malfunctioning government institutions severely harm economic performance through a reduction in both incentives and opportunities to invest and innovate" (Leite and Weidman 1999:3) . Diffuse resources, on the other hand, are more spread out geographically and the ownership of them tends to be shared by many. This type of natural resources therefore results in better institutions and generally also economic policies that promote economic growth (Bulte et al. 2004:14) .
Related to the question of institutional quality are the ones of rent seeking and corruption.
As described above, there is a risk that political elites capture the control over natural resources in an economy with an abundance of point resources. Once these rich resources are in the hand of an influential group of people there is imminent risk of rent seeking behaviour 1 . When people start to invest time and money in trying to capture parts of the "exogenous" wealth created by natural resources instead of taking active part in economic production, the economy is unlikely to grow (Isham et al. 2003:6) . Tightly linked to rent-seeking is the problem of corruption. Leite and Weidman (1999:23) show that an abundance of point resources significantly increases the level of corruption in a country. Their study also confirms what many scholars have found, namely that corruption is detrimental to economic growth. They therefore conclude by claiming that data supports the "…hypothesis of the corruption channel being an important explanation for the slow growth of resource-rich economies" (Leite and Weidman 1999:31) .
Another problem associated with an abundance of natural resource that has been identified is that a country which gets heavily dependent on a resource can experience problems with crowding out of human capital because they are confident that their natural resource is the most important asset. Natural resource abundance may therefore lead to insufficient attention to education. Gylfason (2001:851-4) argues that it is not the natural resource itself that seems to be the problem, but the failure of public authorities to deal with problems that come with the findings of a natural resource, namely by neglecting the importance of education. In 1997, for example, OPEC countries spent less than four percent of their GDP on education, compared to almost five percent for the rest of the world. Gylfason shows that public expenditure on education, expected years of schooling for males and females and secondary-school enrollment for both genders all show a statistically significant negative relationship with natural resource abundance.
It is well established that education stimulates economic growth through several channels of transmission. Education increases the efficiency of the labour force, it creates better conditions for health care, it promotes good governance and institutional stability, all of which have a positive effect on growth (Gylfason 2001:851) . Barro (2001:14) analyzes the impact of education on growth rates, and shows that one extra year of male schooling at secondary or higher level increases the yearly growth rate of GDP by 0.44 percent.
Female education also raises the real growth rate of GDP by lowering the fertility rate.
His results also show that both the quality and the quantity of education significantly increase a country's growth rate, with the quality of education having the largest effect of the two.
It should be pointed out that it is difficult to find a sound theoretical framework that explains why some countries invest more in education than others. However, one proposed explanation of the negative relationship between educational spending and natural resource abundance can be derived from the Dutch Disease theory. According to this a natural resource boom often leads to a contraction of the manufacturing sector.
Since human capital is an important production factor in the manufacturing sector, Gylfasson (2001:856) argues that the need for high-quality education declines when the sector contracts. Additionally, the manufacturing sector is often considered to be an important source of technological progress, and as a consequence there are educational externalities associated with it. If the manufacturing sector contracts it is most likely to have a negative impact on externalities like knowledge and skills. If the contracting sector is not the manufacturing sector, but for example the agricultural sector, the impact on human capital investment will not be the same. Since the demand of well educated labour is low in the agricultural sector, a contraction of this sector does not necessarily lead to decreased spending on education. However, also the booming sector must be considered when analyzing the overall impact of a resource boom on human capital investment. If a strongly expanding capital intensive mining sector does not need a lot of educated labour, then that could still decrease incentives to invest in education. This can make it more difficult for future expansions in sectors abundant in skilled labour, which in turn can lead to slow technological progress (Papyrakis and Gerlagh 2004:189; Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001:5) . Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004:189) empirically investigate the relative importance of different proposed resource curse transmission mechanisms and find that the neglect of education is an important one. They estimate, controlling for other possible resource curse mechanisms' effects on growth, that the relative importance of educational neglect of the total resource curse effect is about ten percent. They claim the importance of neglect of education to be twice as important as the so called "corruption channel".
How Botswana Beat the Resource Curse
Botswana's development level at independence was poor by any standards. Besides cattle production, which was Botswana's traditional and largest export sector during the time of independence, the country had a very shallow industrial base (Harvey and Lewis 1990:30) . During decades after independence, Botswana experienced very high growth rates. The far most important reason for that is the finding and successful exploitation of diamonds in the beginning of the 1970s. The increase in production and exports of diamonds have given Botswana unique economic conditions and largely contributed to the major boost to government revenues. In the mid 1990s, between 75 to 80 percent of government revenues stemmed from the diamond industry in a combination of royalty payments, profits tax and dividends from the 50 percent partnership in the mining 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 was not until the beginning of 1980's that they experienced a big boom. As the diamond boom in Botswana is approaching a long term perspective it is important to keep in mind that the following analysis is based upon medium run effects of the Dutch disease. In the long run the three sector analysis can give quite different results. However, the line between medium run and long run is far from clear cut in economics, and we argue that a medium run analysis is still appropriate for the period studied in this paper.
. 1 . 1 T o w h a t e x t e n t d i d B o t s w a n a s u f f e r f r o m t h e D u t c h d i s e a s e ?
According to the classical Dutch disease theory the movement of labour force to the booming sector from the other sectors raises the general level of wages in the country. In the case of Botswana, it seems like there has not been any extensive labour movement.
Much of the need for labour force movements between the sectors appears to have been eliminated since the mining industry is very capital intense and has only employed about four to five percent of the labour force. The demand for skilled labour in the mining industry has also contributed to the reduced labour force movement. Inherent unemployment and demand for skilled labour has made it possible only for a small part of the labour force to reach high wages, while the bad negotiation situation for unskilled workers in the agricultural sector remains. The fact that the government workforce, which accounts for a big part of the labour force, has been under regulated income policies has also played an important role in preventing substantial salary increases (Jefferis 2005) .
The combination of these factors may account for the modest overall wage increases which consequently have alleviated the resource movement and spending effect during the booming period. The spending effect might also have been mitigated because of the fact that a large part of the consumption stems from import, and therefore reduces the increase in prices in the non-tradable sector (Norberg and Blomström 1993:175-6) .
However, Mogotsi (2002:145) claims that there has been an increase in both household and government spending from the mid 1980s to the big recession in the beginning of the 1990s, while Jefferis (2005) argues that the spending effect was delayed and did not arise until the late 1990s.
In countries suffering from the Dutch disease, the manufacturing sector is usually the contracting sector, but in the case of Botswana it would be more correct to talk about a de-agriculturalisation, since the agricultural sector's share of the economy has declined far more than the manufacturing sector's. Also, employment actually rose in the manufacturing sector, whereas it has decreased in the agricultural sector. Note: Due to lack of space we have decided not to include small and for our purpose less relevant sectors, and the share of total GDP will therefore not sum up to 100 percent.
Botswana's traditional export sector, the agricultural sector, has more or less stayed on the same GDP level in absolute numbers as 30 years ago, but its share of total GDP has contracted from 24.1 to 2.3 percent even though numerous government programmes have been implemented to stimulate productivity and to boost incomes (BIDPA 2004) .
Another verification of the de-agriculturalisation is that the agricultural sector's percentage of the total labour force has declined from 70 percent in 1980 to 42 percent in 1996 (African Development Report 2004:327). The manufacturing sector has had a large relative contraction from 6.8 to 3.6 percent of total GDP 1974 -2004, but its output has increased in absolute numbers. However, the employment in this sector grew even more, which implies that the productivity in it has decreased (Norberg and Blomström 1993:171) . The interpretation of the absolute values for the manufacturing sector isolated would suggest that Botswana has not suffered from the Dutch disease, while an interpretation of the relative values clearly suggests that they have. If one looks at the relative figures for the agricultural sector there has been a large contraction. Whether this is a Dutch disease symptom or not is hard to say, and will be discussed later.
Both the manufacturing and the service sector experienced a sharp decline in relative terms in the beginning of the 1980s, and while the service sector did recover remarkably it seems like the manufacturing sector never managed to pick up. Even though the mining sector has grown substantially over a long period of time, the growth in the industry has been more variable the last decade and is now showing signs of slowing down. The service sector has shown significant increase and has been the fastest growing sector in Botswana since the booming period. The service sector includes the growing government sector, which of course to a large extent has been financed with diamond money.
To sum up, one could say that Botswana has not experienced the most severe symptoms of the Dutch disease, but nevertheless, the growth in the diamond industry may have caused other sectors to lag. However, the decline in relative terms of the manufacturing sector, which is usually the explanation to the harmful effects of a resource boom, was modest, whereas the low-productive and low-competitive agricultural sector has experienced a significant contraction in relative terms. Hence, one could argue that the de-agriculturalisation in Botswana shows that a "mild version" of the disease did exist.
. 1 . 2 W h a t d i d B o t s w a n a d o t o p r e v e n t D u t c h d i s e a s e e f f e c t s ?
One important symptom of the Dutch disease is the appreciation of the real exchange rate, which causes non-booming sectors producing tradable goods to lag. Thus, real exchange rate protection is essential in a country experiencing a large boom in exports. In Botswana, the central bank has constantly strived to keep an appropriate exchange rate.
Its monetary policy seems to have been guided by the trade off between increasing the value of the Pula, in order to keep the inflationary pressure down, and decreasing its value in attempts to boost the export industry. During the 1980s, for example, when the pula was pegged to a trade-weighted basket of currencies, the central bank tried very actively to navigate towards these objectives. Between 1982 and 1985 the pula was devaluated three times to boost exports, in 1985 and 1989 it was revaluated to decrease the inflationary pressure and in 1990 it was devaluated by ten percent in order to offset a decline in export earnings (Norberg and Blomström 1993:167) . During our field study in Botswana for this paper, in June 2005, the Bank of Botswana devaluated the Pula by 12 percent in an attempt to boost exports.
Since the early 1970s, the evolution of inflation has been much like a roller coaster ride, with annual average rates peaking at 18.1 percent in 1974, to more modest figures below ten percent during the last couple of years. As can be seen in Chart 2, the annual average rate of inflation has never been under six percent since 1972. However in a developing country perspective Botswana's inflation rates have not been extremely high. With a fixed exchange rate, a high inflation leads to a real appreciation of the domestic currency.
In the case of Botswana, the inflation rates do not seem to have caused a real appreciation of the Pula during the booming period, as we will show in Chart 4. 
Index, 1976=100
Source: Jefferis 2005 .
Note that the graph shows the price of foreign currencies in terms of Pula. Hence, a decrease in the index describes a depreciation of the Pula.
As can be seen in chart 4, Botswana managed well to protect the real effective exchange rate from appreciating. The REER was more or less hovering around the same level until 1984 when it depreciated sharply for two years. Thereafter it did not show a lot of variance until 1998 when the pula instead started to appreciate, and has done so since.
Given that the major boom took place in the 1980s, an appreciation rather than 4 The Nominal Effective Exchange Rate (NEER) is a weighted average of the most important bilateral nominal exchange rates, with weights based on the trade shares taking into account the relative importance of each currency in the effective exchange rate basket. The Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) is obtained by adjusting the NEER for inflation differentials with the countries whose currencies are included in the basket. As the inflation rate in each country is assumed to broadly indicate the trends in domestic costs of production, the REER could be seen as a reflection of the foreign competitiveness of domestic products. 5 The file containing all data on which the REER is based is very large and has therefore not been included in an appendix. However, upon request the data can be obtained from the authors. depreciation is expected during this time. Thus, the evolution of the REER has not been according to what the theory predicts. Instead the appreciation occurs much later than what is expected. Although Norberg and Blomström (1993:176-7) hold the exchange rate protection to have been more successful than Mogotsi (2002:153-4) 
Institutional Quality, Corruption and Neglect of Education
If there is one transmission mechanism of the resource curse that can easily be rejected in "…professional bureaucracy that has conducted and implemented policy-making efficiently" (Taylor 2004:154) .
As we described earlier, research has shown a relationship between abundance of point natural resources and poor institutions, which in turns has been shown to have a negative impact on growth. In the case of Botswana, the abundant natural resource is clearly a so called point resource. The diamond deposits are highly concentrated geographically and relatively easily controlled. Thus, the type of resource that Botswana is dependent upon is of the kind that has had tendency to result in poor institutional quality and consequently poor economic performance. However, the country seems to have escaped the pitfall of developing a corrupt economic system despite the abundance of natural resources.
The most commonly used measure of corruption is Transparency International's corruption perceptions index (CPI). The surveys used for the index are based on data from the last three years, and measures the degree of corruption in public and political sectors. The scores relate to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
Transparency International's corruption perceptions index gives Botswana a rank of 31 in the world, with a score of 6.0 (Transparency International 2005) . This gives Botswana a position among the best of all developing countries and also well above many richer countries. For example, the country ranks higher than a couple of members of the European Union, such as Italy and Greece. We therefore conclude that corruption is not a severe problem in Botswana, despite the abundance of natural resources.
To assess the question of the institutional quality in Botswana, and to get a general picture of institutions in the country, we will use six different indicators constructed by the World Bank. Aware that some question the reliability and validity of such indices, we have chosen those that seem appropriate for our analysis. These six different Table 2 shows the level of Botswana's institutional quality according to the six above described indicators. The percentile rank shows the percentage of countries in the world that have a lower rating than the country indicated. For all the indicators a higher value implies a better governance rating. Table 2 as a whole can only be interpreted as a confirmation of the high institutional quality in Botswana. Botswana rates way better than the Sub-Saharan African average in all six governance indicators. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region that since long has been raged by war and poor development levels, which is why low levels of democracy and poor economic and political institutions comes as no surprise. More impressive is the fact that Botswana in all indicators is rated to have a better institutional quality than the average of all countries categorized as "upper middle income".
As described earlier, countries abundant in natural resources also tend to neglect the importance of education to long-term growth. In the case of Botswana, though, no traces seem to found of such a development. Soon after independence, before the diamond findings, the country invested heavily in education. The government first stressed the importance of secondary education, but later also invested in primary education.
Inequalities in access to education were successively reduced by building schools in more remote areas of the country. By the beginning of the 1980s, when the country was starting to enjoy the virtues of the diamond industry, the successful increase in supply of primary education further increased the demand for secondary education, which was responded to by the government (Harvey and Lewis 1990:285-287) . The focus on education has continued since and has resulted in impressive improvements in the educational record of Botswana.
The most common way to evaluate how much a government values education is to look at the percentage of GDP spent on education. While the amount of public spending on education does not say really anything about the outcome of the spent money, the measure is the commonly used in economic literature and does give an idea of how much priority is given by the government to education. As table 3 shows, for most of the period 1960-1999, Botswana has spent an increasing share of GDP on education. As mentioned earlier, the world as a whole spends on average around five percent of GDP on education.
Compared to the world average of five percent, the 9.21 percent of GDP spent on education in Botswana in 1996 is definitely very high. Concerning the level of education in countries, one has to distinguish between quantity of education and quality of education. Measuring the quality of the education in Botswana would be very difficult, since we do not know either of any international comparisons of the level of Botswana's educational system, or of any internationally standardized tests used in schools in Botswana. However, looking at enrollment rates at different levels of education we can get a good idea of the quantity of education in Botswana during the last decades. As mentioned earlier, Barro (2001:16) has shown that the quantity of education has a significantly positive effect on growth, even though the effect of educational quality is even more important.
Important measures of educational participation are the enrollment rates on primary, secondary and tertiary level. As could be expected, given the status of education in Botswana at independence and the big attention given to improving it by the government, 
Avoiding the Dutch Disease
One of the harmful effects is when growth generating industries, such as manufacturing, are crowded out. Botswana has successfully managed to avoid de-industrialisation because of thorough strategies for the economic policy, income regulations and since supplementary labour from the labour pool easily could fill vacancies, hence limiting the resource movement effect and the rise in overall wages. Also, the agricultural sector, which has clearly taken the big hit in the transformation of the economy, was never a very growth-generating industry. One can argue that symptoms of Dutch disease did appear, but in a dissimilar form, a de-agriculturalisation. The contraction of the agricultural sector might have been an effect of labour movements to an expanding service sector that likely has been stimulated through the growth of and the increased spending in the government sector. However, poor soils and difficult droughts are other possible explanations to the contraction of the sector and even if Botswana would not have suffered from any Dutch disease effects at all, the agricultural sector may still have contracted due to the low productivity in the sector.
The fact that the manufacturing industry has performed quite well since the diamond boom is not compatible with the Dutch disease model. This suggests that the industry may have been fairly competitive internationally even though it, as a share of total GDP, contracted domestically. The decline in productivity in the manufacturing sector can be due to skilled labour being absorbed by a growing service sector. Since the manufacturing industry has been rather small, both in absolute and relative figures, one could argue it is unlikely that this sector has played a major part in the strong overall growth in Botswana. However, the growth in absolute numbers of the manufacturing sector might have had some implications for the economic development. For many years the government in Botswana supported the manufacturing industry heavily. For example, attempts at diversifying the economy away from diamond dependency were made by trying to put a large and competitive clothing industry in place. These attempts have stopped in recent years since the industry did not show signs of being able to compete internationally (Jefferis, 2005) . Still, it is possible that the support of the manufacturing industry had other positive effects on the economy. As described earlier, the manufacturing sector is generally considered as an engine of growth and a sector with plenty of linkages to the rest of the economy. Hence, in supporting the manufacturing industry, Botswana might have weakened the de-industrialization that can be so detrimental to long-term growth.
A growing service sector is compatible with the Dutch disease theory. The difficulty in importing services (compared to consumer goods) might be a part of the reason for the impressive growth in the domestic service sector. However, a growing service sector is often observed in growing economies. It is therefore difficult to determine whether the growth in the service sector in Botswana is due to Dutch disease effects or simply an effect of the modernization of the economy.
It is not easy to explain why Botswana suffered less from the Dutch disease than did many other mineral exporting countries. The fact that the ruling party, the BDP, has had a big support and been in office for almost 40 straight years has likely helped the government to implement and maintain persistent economic policies, like the exchange rate protection and income regulations. Income policies might have given the sensitive tradable sectors some protection in order to adjust more smoothly to the rapid change of the economy. The foreign exchange reserves have had a steady growth during a long period of time, and it seems as though Botswana has resisted the temptation of monetizing a lot of the mining revenues in the country. This shows the country's commitment to exchange rate protection and also to economic stability in order to avoid de-industrialization.
It is justified to ask the question whether Dutch disease really is a disease, or if the symptoms are part of a normal economic adjustment process that is unavoidable, like a shift to a new equilibrium? Whereas it is clear that Botswana has not had any severe symptoms of the Dutch disease, the transformation of the economy did nevertheless cause other sectors to lag. However, the decline in relative terms of the manufacturing sector, which is usually the explanation to the harmful effects of a resource boom, could have been worse, and instead the low-productive and low-competitive agricultural sector's share of GDP decreased significantly. While the de-agriculturalisation in Botswana indicates that a bout of the disease actually did exist, this form of the disease was obviously not very serious.
Botswana's High Institutional Quality
Different theories have been advanced to explain the good democratic institutions in place in Botswana. According to Harvey and Lewis (1990:10) , local tribes in Botswana also have a long tradition of democratic procedures in decision-making. Before the creation of modern institutions in Botswana, local tribes played an important role in governing society. These tribes, kgotla, were democratically governed and the leaders of the tribes listened to advice and were responsive to the tribe members' opinions. This is likely to have helped in creating a democratic environment at independence. Also, Botswana has a long history of pragmatic negotiation with its powerful neighbors. This might have given Botswana a habit of negotiating and compromising, which is valuable in democratic societies.
Another reason could be that Botswana's first governments largely consisted of former cattlemen. Many of the post-colonial problems in Sub-Saharan Africa have been associated with neglect of rural interests, due to lack of rural representation in central politics. This was never the case in Botswana (Harvey and Lewis 1990:9-10) . The fact that Botswana leaders had a background in cattle farming, which was the main productive sector at independence, created a situation where improved infrastructure and economic institutions was not only in the country's economic interest, but also in the self-interest of the country's leaders (Taylor 2004:155) . This situation contrasts strongly to that of many African countries during the last decades. Many of these have a long history of leaders that have acted purely in self-interest, most often at the cost of the country and its population. In Botswana, however, the self-interest of the leaders induced policies that were also beneficial to the country as a whole.
In the introductory chapter we described how the British colonialists' neglect of Botswana contributed to the poor economic heritage of the country. The other side of the coin is that the British' neglect of Botswana paradoxically resulted in better political institutions, which in turn has helped the economic development of the country. Since the British Empire only had a limited interest in Botswana the colonial rule there was limited.
As a result, the impressive pre-colonial institutions essentially survived the colonial period. Hence, in contrast to many other colonized countries, Botswana found itself with decent political institutions at the time of independence (Acemoglu et al. 2001:20) .
The former deputy chief of Bank of Botswana, Keith Jefferis (2005) , points at the importance of the order in which the institutions and diamonds were found by stating:
"Since the institutions arrived before the diamonds the institutions reflects poverty and not richness, and when diamonds were found the surplus was saved rather than spend".
Another way of putting it is that Botswana was "lucky" to discover diamonds after the institutions were formed, instead of forming institutions after the diamonds were found.
Had the diamonds arrived before solid institutions were in place, there is imminent risk that poor institutions had been put in place. This view is shared by Acemoglu et al. increased British interest and involvement in Bechuanaland would probably have had a negative impact on the well-developed pre-colonial institutions in place in Botswana.
To sum up, we have shown that Botswana has used their diamond resources into longterm economic growth. This development contrasts with the experience of many other natural resource dependent countries, which we partly attribute to the country's ability to avoid severe Dutch disease effects. However, equally important factors to Botswana's impressive economic performance have been the well-functioning and stable institutions, the relatively low corruption and the big educational improvements.
One issue we have not approached in this paper is the possible, and probable, interplay between the transmissions channels we have analyzed. We mainly treat them separately, although they are likely to affect each other in different ways. The high institutional quality of Botswana, for example might have affected the way the country prevented some of the Dutch disease symptoms to emerge. For instance, we mentioned the democratic stability as a determining factor for the government's long-term engagement to macroeconomic stability. Nevertheless, we mainly discuss the mechanisms separately.
A more statistical approach to the issue, using a set of cross-country data over time, would allow for further conclusions to be drawn on how these different resource curse mechanisms interact.
Final discussion
If there is one big problem to the future economic growth, development and poverty reduction in Botswana, it is obviously the raging HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to UNAIDS (2004:2) , the prevalence rate of the population between the age of 15 and 49 is 37.3 percent, which is among the very highest rates in the world. Botswana is one of the most economically unequal countries in the world. This provides strong evidence that the whole population has not benefited equally from the strong economic growth. Somewhat more encouraging is the evolution of poverty, which has decreased substantially during the past decades: In 1985/86, 57 percent of the population lived in poverty. In 1993-94 the figure had gone down to 47 percent, and according to the latest survey the poverty ratio was down to 30 percent in 2002/03 (CSO 2005) . However, the critical observer will claim that a poverty ratio of 30 percent in a country that had the highest growth rates in the world for decades is still far from acceptable. One reason for the high inequality and poverty in Botswana are the high unemployment rates which have plagued the country for decades. According to the most recent estimates from Botswana, the unemployment rate was at 23.8 percent in 2002/03 (CSO 2005) .
As is the case with many natural resources, diamonds cannot enrich Botswana perpetually. According to a confidential report, quoted in the Sunday Standard (2005) ,
Botswana's mining company Debswana will close down all its mines in 20 years time.
By then, the revenues from the diamond mines will have dropped from the current 12 billion pula to less than four billion, at which point mining will no longer be profitable.
The article concludes by stating that "…if the fears expressed by Debswana engineers come true, Botswana will have to come up with world class industries in the next few years to take over from diamonds and fill the gap" (Sunday Standard 2005) . This paper has shown that Botswana succeeded well with the task of adapting to a life with the diamonds. Knowing, however, that diamonds do not last forever, the story has not yet ended positively. Only the future will show if the country can also adapt to do without the diamonds. 9 12,4 12,9 12,9 12,1 12,1 12,7 12,8 13,8 14,7 13,9 10 . Social and Personal Services 2,4 2,8 2,6 2,2 2,2 1,9 2,1 2,3 2,3 2,1 2,4 2,5 2,6 3,0 3,8
